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Simone Weil’s Radical Ontology of Rootedness:
Natural and Supernatural Justices
Alexandre A. Martins
Marquette University

Abstract: Tis paper argues that Simone Weil developed an anthropology of the
human condition that is a radical ontology of the human spirit rooted in reality.
Weil begins her account from the real, but this real is not only the historical or
social reality. It is also what is true about the human person as a created being
in connection with the transcendent reality. She believes that afiction reveals
the human condition and provides an openness to transcendence in which
the individual fnds the meaning of the human operation of spirit. Terefore,
Weil’s radical ontology is based on a philosophy of the human being as an agent
rooted in the world. In order to be rooted, a human being needs decreation (the
creation of a new human) and incarnation (cross and love in the world). In her
radical ontology derived from attention to the real, Weil argues for an active
incarnation in social reality that recognizes others, especially the unfortunates,
for the purpose of empowering them and promoting their dignity. Her radical
ontology incarnates the human in the world between necessity and good, that
is, between the natural and the supernatural.
Keywords: human condition, reality, rootedness, natural justice, supernatural
justice

C

onsidering Emmanuel Gabellieri’s characterization of Simone
Weil’s anthropological philosophy as a radical ontology, I examine
Weil’s account on natural and supernatural justices. According
to Gabellieri, Weil’s ontology is radical because it is “a metaphysics of the
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human spirit oriented towards a full contact with reality.”1 Full contact with
the reality of the world is the starting point of Simone Weil’s philosophy. Tis
contact is radical because the supernatural is present in reality, and a deep
experience of reality opens the individual for the illumination of the supernatural, an experience of grace that reveals the truth of human existence and
condition in the world. Terefore, Simone Weil develops an anthropology of
the human condition that is a “radical ontology” of the human spirit rooted
in the reality of the world. Te experience of rootedness occurs in reality, but
it is the supernatural that roots the human being. Weil suggests an anthropology of radical ontology following the Platonic tradition of a transcendental
spirit that contemplates the nous. Tis generates a noetic knowledge2 that
impacts reality.3 It is in this mediation between reality and the supernatural
that the need for justice occurs, as a natural reality illuminated and guided by
supernatural justice. In this account, she is also inside the Christian mystic
tradition, in which the experience of grace impacts the ethical life leading to
seek for justice.4 To understand Weil’s radical ontology, this paper will discuss
three points of her account: her starting point from the real, the movement of
decreation and openness of the working of grace, and the supernatural justice
that illuminates the natural justice in a rooted people.

1. From the Real
Reality is related to what is real. Although these words are related, they have
an important distinction in Simone Weil’s philosophy. She begins her account
Emmanuel Gabellieri, Être et don: Simone Weil et la philosophie (Louvain: Éditions
Peeters: 2003; my translation), 28.
2
Noetic Knowledge is a concept originated from Plato’s philosophy to refer to the
experience of contact with the transcendental reality. Tis is an experience that generates
knowledge because it is a contact with truth. It goes beyond a psychological experience, but
rather it is an experience of the human spirit. In the Christian tradition, a noetic experience
is also identifed as a mystical experience in which the mystical person encounters with
God, the truth. Tis encounter generates knowledge.
3
Weil clearly stresses her philosophy as a movement of the spirit that seeks for truth
in the supernatural in an experience that will be felt in all circumstances of life. See Simone
Weil, Œuvres complètes VI: Cahiers 1 (Paris: Gallimard,194), 174–176. In addition, she
adopted Plato and his school of thinking as the true philosophy. See Weil, Œuvres complètes
V: Questions politiques et religieuses 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 120.
4
Educated in a secular Jewish family, Weil did not have a religious formation, but in
her search for the truth, she found it in Jesus’ cross, through a mystic experience described
by her as an encounter with Christ that led her to discover Christianity as a religion of
slaves. She had to embody this tradition among them. Simone Weil, Attente de Dieu (Paris:
La Colombe, 1950), 75.
1
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from the real, but this real is not only the historical or social reality. It is also
what is true about the human person as a created being in connection with
the transcendent reality. In Robert Chenavier’s words, “the awakening of the
real is the starting point of philosophy for Simone Weil.”5 Chenavier argues
that Weil has a philosophy that is an exercise of attention to what is real. It
is a philosophy from the real that includes the reality of the materialist world
and goes beyond with the intervention of the supernatural.6 From what is
concrete, Weil develops her understanding of human existence and history.
However, her philosophy is not a materialistic anthropology; otherwise, Weil
would be characterized as a person who had described only material realities.
Tis is her criticism of Aristotle and modern philosophy that, according to
Weil, are only good representations of the universe. Tey do not follow the
transcendental orientation of the Platonic method.7 Following this orientation, Weil’s anthropology is an exercise of the human spirit illuminated by
the supernatural. It is a creative exercise of attention, that includes attention
to those who are unfortunates (malheureux).8 Tese, for Weil, are those who
sufer because of any kind of oppression, marked by an experience of afiction,
that I will develop later. In her context, frst half of the twentieth century in
France, the workers, oppressed by precarious working conditions, long hours
and low wages, were the unfortunates that she frst knew and experienced also
being a worker herself. Ten she expanded this group. Maria Clara Bingemer
helps us to understand Weil’s expanded conception of unfortunates and its
relationship with her own experience of afiction:
Te contemplation of connaturality of the poor in this world with Christianity . . . is felt by Simone Weil, marked like red hot iron of slavery in
her experience in the factory, as the place to which she belongs. Being on
the side of the least of the world, of those who are disdained and consid-

5
Robert Chenavier, Simone Weil: L’attention au réel (Paris: Éditions Michalon, 2009,
my translation), 35.
6
Commenting on this aspect of Weil’s thought, Chenavier says: “Te role of the
supernatural in the world, in its silent intervention, does not escape from the law of the
real, which is necessity. To deny that this intervention can be studied as a specifc form of
necessity is to deny the reality of the supernatural.” Ten he quotes Weil’s work Oppression
et liberté: “True knowledge of the social mechanism implies the knowledge of the conditions
under which the supernatural operation of an infnitely small quantity of pure good, when
properly placed, can neutralize this gravity.” Chenavier, Simone Weil, 53.
7
Simone Weil, Œuvres complètes V 1: Questions politique et religieuses (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 120.
8
Weil, “Formes de l’amour implicite de Dieu,” in Œuvres, ed. Florence de Lussy
(Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 1999), 724.
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ered insignifcant, is where the Christianity should be, and it is where she
should also be.9

Bingemer examines Weil’s account in dialogue with liberation theology
and its concept of preferential option for the poor. According to her, the unfortunates is the Weilien name for the poor, the victims of oppression and the
agents of transformation for liberation theology.10 In the reality of the unfortunates, Weil experienced the supernatural in the midst of her own afiction.
Tis occurs in a double movement of attention: to the supernatural, which Weil
encountered Jesus’s cross, and to the unfortunates in their sufering, creating
an encounter between history and transcendent. In this reality, the movement
of the spirit is the movement of the intellect that creates philosophy.
Real is a better word than reality to express the starting point of Simone
Weil’s philosophy. But real and reality move together in Weil’s concept of
attention to what is historical and transcendental. Sometimes the distinction
between real and reality is in the details of specifc sentences and their complexity. Following Plato, who for her is “a mystical heir of a mystical tradition
in which Greece was entirely immersed,”11 the real is also God who created
the earthly reality and, by the incarnation, decided to be part of his creation
as a sufering God who assumes the human condition. Te real occurs between the natural, the earthly world, and the supernatural, the transcendent
world, mediated by the incarnation of the Son. Reality is the history that the
human being walks as part of creation. Humankind and its history are real.
Tey have the presence of God, who is real through His presence in sufering
and love (Jesus’s cross is the concrete mediation). Te attention to the real is
a double orientation: to the reality of creation where humankind realizes its
being throughout history and to the reality of God who, by a double gesture
of self-humility, creates the world and incarnates in it.12 Terefore, Weil’s philosophy presents an anthropology in which the immanent originates in the
transcendent (by creation) and gains autonomy and the transcendent chooses
to be in the immanent (by incarnation) to love and liberate it, providing an
authentic consciousness of the fragile condition of humankind as a created

Maria Clara Bingemer, “A desventura e a opção pelos pobres: Simone Weil e a Teologia da Libertação Latino-Americana,” REB 69, no. 276 (2009): 782 (my translation).
10
Ibid., 783.
11
Weil, Œuvres complètes IV 2: Écrits de Marseille (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), 75. All
quotes of Simone Weil’s writings from French editions are my translation from the original
in French.
12
Weil, La Pesanteur et la grâce (Paris: Plon, 2007), 56–57, 82–83.
9
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nature.13 Attention to the real is an awakening from a dream to the human
condition, its fragility, and the presence/dependency on God.
We are in unreality, in a dream. Renouncing our imaginary central situation, and renouncing it not only through our intelligence, but also in the
imaginative part in the soul, it is an awakening to the real, to eternity; it
is to see the true light, to hear the true silence. A transformation operates
then in the root of sensitivity itself, in an immediate way, to receive sensible
impressions and psychological impressions.14

Te real begins to be real for an individual when he/she realizes the
world as harmony between the earthly reality and the divine presence. Te
earthly reality is where the natural justice is embodied to be concrete, or real
justice, by the action of the divine presence, that is, the supernatural justice.
(Although, for Weil, humankind tends to kill justice when it is manifested
in the world. She argues this while presenting the killing of justice in Plato’s
Republic, the sufering servant in Isaiah, and the crucifxion of Jesus.)15 Te
perception of this harmony (also mediation) is a movement of openness of
spirit to be afected by the love that is responsible for maintaining the order
of the world, a natural order that must also be an order of justice. Tis is the
movement of philosophy presented in Plato, especially in his allegory of the
cave. Moving beyond the cave, what Weil characterizes as the material reality
and its organization as a human society is an act of searching for the true light
in which knowledge will fourish. It is a movement of the ascent of the human
spirit to fnd a light that is the good. Finding this good, the human will love
it, and from this relationship of love rises a knowledge that is the vision of our
intelligence.16 Weil interprets Plato as stressing the experience of revelation of
the real, that is, the real human nature and its relationship with God, or in
Plato’s language, the Good.

. In the Real, Decreation
For Simone Weil, there are many ways that a person can live this movement of
attention to the real and the supernatural. But any way must be an experience
of decreation, as a process of annihilation of the “I.” She says: “Te only way
into truth is through one’s own annihilation; through dwelling a long time
13
Weil, Œuvres complètes IV 1: Écrits de Marseille (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 273. She
refects here the connection and non-separation between the Creation and the Passion.
14
Weil, Œuvres complètes IV 1, 300.
15
Weil, Œuvres complètes IV 2, 221–223.
16
Weil, Œuvres complètes IV 2, 211.
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in a state of extreme and total humiliation.”17 Tis is an experience of grace:
“Only by the supernatural working of grace can a soul pass through its own
annihilation to the place where alone it can get the sort of attention which can
attend to truth and to afiction.”18 Although Weil does not deny the possibility
of decreation in a personal efort of asceticism, she sees the experience of afiction as a privileged way of decreation and openness for the working of grace.19
In this experience, the person is enlightened about the situation of oppression
of the reality surrounding him/her, understanding that social conditions of
oppression are not a necessary part of the human existence. However, it is still
necessary to develop awareness to comprehend the mechanisms that create
this oppression. After graduating from École Normale Supérieure, Weil saw her
work of teaching proletarians in a factory as a mission and contribution in this
process of social awareness.20
Weil believes that sufering and the experience of work reveal the human
condition and provide an openness to the supernatural in which the individual
fnds the meaning of the human operation of spirit. Sufering and discovering
the human authenticity of being and its realization in history are a process of
growing in humility in imitation of God who had to humiliate himself both
to create and to incarnate. Terefore, the radical ontology of Weil is based on
a philosophy of the human being (anthropology) as an agent rooted in reality
by the mediation of the God’s presence (grace: creation and incarnation) in the
world. In order to be rooted, a human person needs decreation (the creation of
a new human) and incarnation (cross and love in the world).
Decreation is the status that makes possible restoring equilibrium21 in
the world by taking the human being from a force responsible for preventing
him from an authentic life. Decreation liberates the person from the infuence
Simone Weil, “Human Personality,” in Simone Weil: An Anthology, ed. Siân Miles
(New York: Grove Press, 1986), 70.
18
Ibid., 71–72.
19
It seems for me that the natural justice can only existed when it is embodied by
people in this status of humiliation, as a result of a supernatural work of grace. Terefore,
the supernatural justice becomes the guide of the natural justice performed by humble
people who recognize their obligations toward others, and their necessity of meet their needs.
20
Weil, “Carta a Albertine Ténevon,” in Simone Weil: A Condição Operária e Outros
Estudos sobre a Opressão, ed. Ecléa Bosi, 2nd ed. (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1996), 79. In her
experience as an employee of a car factory, Weil joined her co-workers after a long day of
manual labor to teach them the mechanisms that guide society and create oppression. She
believed that one of the main sources of oppression was the separation between intellectual
and manual labors. She had to work to unify them.
21
Bartomeu Estelrich has an article about the relevance of Simone Weil for our current
time in which he refects about this relation between decreation and restoring equilibrium
in the world. See Estelrich, “Simone Weil on Modern Disequilibrium,” in Te Relevance of
17
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of the pesanteur (gravity) and opens to the supernatural with the possibility
of receiving the grace. Decreation not only opens the human being to receive
God’s grace,22 but it also embodies human sufering and its lack of meaning
before the silence of God. Tis reveals the nature and the condition of the
human being as a created, fnite being. Even if the experience of grace does
not happen—Weil, following the Christian mystical tradition, emphasizes
grace as a decision that depends only on God’s wish and love—decreation will
liberate the person from a false satisfaction of the human void. Sufering is
the privileged way to experience this process of revelation of who the human
being is and [perhaps] the encounter with God’s grace.
Decreation is not destruction of creation. Rather, it is the new creation
that reveals what creation, especially humanity, is and its real vocation. Simone
Weil says: “God created the world and wishes eternally that it is. . . .To destroy
[the world] is wrong, other than making it pass from created to uncreated.
Destruction is a bad imitation (an ersatz) of this operation.”23 Actually, decreation is the way of raising the “new man,” the new creature, as the New
Testament afrms, to be the experience of encounter with the Incarnate God.
Te new creation is not new, rather it is a movement of fnding the created
nature of humanity and all things in the world, a consciousness that humanity
has lost by flling its void with illusions and denying its sufering condition.
Commenting on this, Emmanuel Gabellieri stresses: “Yet one needs to note
that de-creation, far from corresponding to destruction of creatureliness, on the
contrary, corresponds to consenting to this one [creatureliness].”24 Decreation
is actually a recreation of the person in an experience of God’s mercy in the
world. For Weil, “mercy is the visible presence of God here [on the earth]”25 by
experiencing God’s mercy and embodying compassion towards the other. Tis
is the supernatural work of grace with real consequences in human relations.
It is in this movement of decreation and openness for the supernatural
work of grace that Simone Weil builds her account of natural and supernatural
justices as reality (or social organization) that allows the human search for his/
her roots, and the grace (or supernatural reality) that roots the human in his/
her fragile and contingent condition.
the Radical: Simone Weil 100 Years Later, ed. A. Rebecca Rozelle-Stone and Lucian Stone
(New York: Continuum, 2010), 3–17.
22
Scholars often have asserted that Weil develops a “mysticism of decreation.” For
example, see Gabellieri, Être et don 1; 250–252.
23
Simone Weil, Œuvres complètes VI 2: Cahiers 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 349–50.
24
Gabellieri, Être et don, 493.
25
Weil, Œuvres complètes VI 4: La connaissance surnaturelle (Paris: Gallimard, 2006),
131.
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3. Natural and Supernatural Justices
In L’Enracinement, Simone Weil argues for social justice embodying actions
from a supernatural justice responsible to reveal the human condition and
to assume the recognition of others as an imperative. As I said before, Weil
follows the mystical Christian tradition based on God’s mercy and love for
the other. Emmanuel Gabellieri argues that Weil’s writings ofer a theology of
mercy that begins with her own experience of God’s mercy in her afiction.26
Her account of natural and supernatural justices is better understood in light
of her mysticism, that is between what Henrique de Lima Vaz defnes as a
“speculative and prophetic mysticism.”27 As this tradition asserts, Weil afrms
that mystical unity depends only on God’s grace, that the human being only
creates conditions for this unity by emptying his/herself.28 It is from this mystical unity—an experience of mercy—that one individual, once empty, free
from what created imagination fulflling the emptiness,29 moves to the other in
a movement of compassion and recognition.
Tis recognition occurs in the experience of humiliation: decreation and
openness to the working of grace. Tus, malheur (afiction)30 becomes the
privileged form to lead us to the recognition of the other because afiction
Emmanuel Gabellieri, “Pensar a Kenosis: Filosofa e Teologia da Misericórdia em
Simone Weil,” REB 69, no. 276 (2009): 792–805.
27
According to Lima Vaz, the mystic experience of Western tradition has three main
forms: speculative, mysterium, and prophetic. See Henrique C. de Lima Vaz, Experiência
Mística e Filosofa na Tradição Ocidental (São Paulo: Loyola, 2000). On the Christian mystical tradition, I recommend the tremendous work in three volumes of Bernard McGinn
in which he afrms mysticism as a direct experience of God that happens in an instant.
See Bernard McGinn, Te Foundations of Mysticism, v. I (New York: Crossroad, 2003).
28
Weil, Œuvres complètes IV: Écrits de Marseille 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 267; Weil,
La Pesanteur et la grâce, 82–84.
29
“Imagination fulflling the emptiness” is Weil’s concept that she developed to show
all the elements from the contingent world that the human being seeks and attaches him/
herself to illusory fulfll the existence marked by a void imposed by the distance between
God and the creation. Weil, La Pesantuer et la Grâce, 82.
30
Malheur is the French word that Simone Weil chose to express a kind of sufering
that afects human individuals in their totality, including physical, psychological, social,
and spiritual sufering. Weil afrmed that this word is almost impossible to translate into
other languages. Frequently, English commentators and translators of Weil’s work translate
malheur as afiction. See, for example, Diogenes Allen’s and Eric O. Springted’s commentary
of malheur in the chapter “Te Enigma of Afiction” in Spirit, Nature, and Community:
Issues in the Tought of Simone Weil (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),
97–100 and the translation of Simone Weil’s essay “L’amour de Dieu et le malheur” that
was published as “Te Love of God and Afiction” in On Science, Necessity, and Te Love
of God, trans. Richard Rees (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
26
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reveals both who we humans are and our need for the supernatural. Terefore,
the human roots are connected both to the natural (social historical reality)
and to the supernatural (the transcendent reality, the grace that touches the
human condition). Te connection between these realities reveals the real of
human existence.
Te supernatural reveals our obligation of recognition, inclusion, and
justice for the other in an active compassion toward establishing a concrete
participation in the socio-political arena and social goods. In her radical ontology derived from attention to the real, Weil argues for an active incarnation in
social reality that recognizes others, foremost the unfortunates, for the purpose
of empowering them and promoting their dignity. Tis recognition becomes
a realization of justice by the realization of obligations to others.31 Tey must
meet the needs of the soul,32 being obligations for justice in compassion that
stem from the human condition as a reality of insufciency shared by all.
Compassion to the other is a key element for justice in Weil’s account.
E. Jane Doering suggests that Weil “develops the rationale for justice administered with compassion and explained the role of the supernatural love.”33 In
the essay, Formes de l’amour implicite de Dieu, Weil argues that compassion and
gratitude are essential for justice in the world because they lead us to respect
the dignity of the unfortunates.34 Tis occurs with a movement of attention to
the neighbor, that is, the other who is in an inferior condition. While justice
can realize only among equals and the relationship between the powerful and
the weak is never equal, supernatural justice is necessary to make the powerful recognize the weak, that is the unfortunates, in order to treat him/her as
an equal. Weil names it: “the virtue of the supernatural.”35 Tus, this virtue
Weil opens her book: “Te notion of obligation goes beyond the notion of rights
that are subordinated and relative [to obligation].” She states that right does not support by
itself, but it is an obligation that originates from human beings who recognize each other the
rights of the other. Consequently, this leads to an obligation of respecting and promotion
of rights. She adds: “Identic obligations link all human beings, although they correspond
to diferent acts according to situations.” Te object of these obligations is the human being
who is an imperative for the other by the simple fact of being a human. Tis fact connects
everybody in the same requirement of fulflling obligations. Moreover, obligations are not
limited by contexts and structures. Tey are eternal. See Simone Weil, “L’Enracinement,”
in Œuvres, ed. Florence de Lussy (Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 1999), 1027–1028.
32
According to Simone Weil, the needs of the soul are: order, liberty, obedience,
responsibility, equality, hierarchy, honor, punishment, freedom of opinion, security, risk,
private property, collective property, and truth. See Weil “L’Enracinement,” 1031–1051.
33
E. Jane Doering, Simone Weil and the Specter of Self-Perpetuating Force (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 184.
34
Weil, “Formes de l’amour implicite de Dieu,” 720.
35
Ibid., 722.
31
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establishes a relationship of exchange between compassion and gratitude. Te
reference to the neighbor is related to the Gospel because this relationship is
a teaching from Jesus: “Christ taught us that supernatural love to the neighbor is the exchange of compassion and gratitude that is generated as a light
between two beings in which one has power and the other is prevented from
this human personality.”36
Weil emphasizes that supernatural love is a movement of attention to
the unfortunates, who are our neighbor and we do not see them. Attention
is a creative force which makes us to see what is not seen, as the Samaritan in
the Gospel saw the wounded man on the road. She says: “Creative attention
consists in making the true attention to see what does not exist.”37 Ten she
adds: “Love sees the invisible.”38
In her radical ontology from attention to the real, Simone Weil argues
for an active incarnation, as a true attention to the invisible, in social reality
in recognition of others, with the unfortunates frst in line, toward their empowerment and promotion of dignity. Weil explains this by emphasizing the
rootedness of people in the reality between natural and supernatural justices.
Te metaphor of rootedness may give the interpretation of a passive attitude
in the world, but it is actually the exact opposite. It is an active and dynamic
incarnation in the world from a supernatural power that defnes this incarnation
in society. Simone Weil’s existential choices, activism, and mysticism do not
allow us to interpret her proposal in a diferent way.39
Weil’s notion of obligations specifes the social dynamism of a rooted
people that a focus on individual rights cannot provide. In this sense, an argument for human rights from the metaphysical dignity of the individual, as
Jacques Maritain was arguing at that time,40 is insufcient to lead to justice
because this argument omits human sufering in the midst of social conditions
and the necessity of humility to recognize the needs of the others. A notion
of inalienable rights, grounded on a metaphysic of inner, “fails to be of much

Ibid., 724.
Ibid., 726.
38
Ibid.
39
On her existential choices, see Maria Clara Bingemer, Simone Weil: Mystic of Passion
and Compassion (Eugene, OR.: Cascade Books, 2015), 4–37.
40
Jacques Maritain, Os Direitos do Homem (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora,
1967).
See also Joseph M. de Torre, “Te Common Good and Te Good Society” in Garvin T.
Colvert, ed., Te Renewal of Civilization: Essays in Honor of Jacques Maritain (Washington
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 31–39. In this essay, Torre examines
Maritain’s conception of individual dignity and its relation to the society.
36
37
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help when dealing with the aficted.”41 In addition, only human rights with
metaphysical foundations seem to have a romanticized aspect that leads to a
certain passivity of discourse without a practice that embodies it. Simone Weil
wrote L’Enracinement before the International Declaration of Human Rights.
She had before her the frustrated Napoleonic human declaration, the oppression of workers, World War II, and a debate about defending human dignity.
Today, more than a half-century after the Human Rights Declaration, we see
how human rights have been present in many discourses by world leaders but
that they have lacked the power to make people and nations have real obligations. Human rights language has been used according to what is convenient
for the “I” (which could be the interest of one person, a group, or a nation);
it has even functioned as an argument for military coups, invasions, and wars.
On the one hand, a metaphysical foundation for the concept of human
dignity is insufcient because it opens to a romanticized conception of human
rights. On the other hand, a secular conception that dismisses the supernatural is unable to touch the authenticity of human existence and to promote
it, especially where social sufering is destroying lives. Simone Weil provides
a synthesis in which the radicalism of social activism is guided by the radicalism of grace in obligations embodied by an empty “I” rooted in the real.
Weil’s radical ontology incarnates the human in the world between necessity
and good, that is, between natural and supernatural. Mediation is important
here between creation and incarnation of the human as an imitation of God’s
humble actions of creating and incarnating. Being rooted is assumed to be a
meditative function of participation in Jesus’s cross, the mediation between
natural and supernatural.42
In L’Enracinement, Weil proposes a society that creates conditions for individuals to become rooted in order to participate in Jesus, the mediator with
roots in natural and supernatural realities. Tis becomes visible in obligations,
practices of compassion, love, and justice to others. “Justice is the exercise of
the supernatural love.”43

Allen and Springsted, Spirit, Nature, and Community, 181.
Gabellieri develops the importance of mediation in Simone Wei’s philosophy
inspired in the Greeks and in her emphasis on Incarnation and its truth. See Emmanuel
Gabellieri, “Simone Weil: Uma Filosofa da Mediação e do Dom,” in Simone Weil: Ação
e Contemplação, ed. Guilia P. di Nicola and Maria C. L. Bingemer (Bauru: Edusc, 2005),
187–214.
43
Weil, Œuvres Complètes VI 4, 174.
41

42
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Conclusion
Natural and supernatural justices exist in a harmonious relation in attention to
afiction. Tis harmony occurs in an experience of decreation and rootedness
that reveals the reality of the human condition and the world, leading individuals to see others in their sufering and struggles. Hence, the recognition
of others is framed by compassion and obligations in the realization of natural
and supernatural justices that force us to act in order to empower the other.
Tese obligations concretize the rights of humans (as natural justice) who must
satisfy their needs in a society that allows them to be rooted (encounter with the
supernatural). Te experience of sufering is a weakness that is paradoxically a
strength against the force44 responsible for uprooting individuals and peoples.
At the same time, sufering raises compassion, a principle for recognizing the
other in his/her vulnerability and pain. Consequently, to be real, compassion
becomes a movement to force obligations on the human. In Weil’s radical
ontology, compassion and social reality are crucial for the incarnation of the
supernatural justice in the natural justice necessary in the world, truth revealed
in the incarnation of Jesus and his experience of afiction on the cross. Although
Weil’s account is grounded on a mystical experience which depends on God’s
grace and not on people’s will, her radical ontology ofers a path to Christians
to unify a deep spiritual life of intimacy with God with the praxis of justice for
the oppressed and the poor of our time. Tis perspective ofers an alternative
way for those who feel part of the Catholic faith, but have difculty to accept
the authority of its institutional dimension, reality that Weil experienced in
her own faith in Jesus, considering herself a Catholic “of right” but not “of
fact” in the threshold of the Church.45

On Simone Weil’s account on force as a violence that ‘crushed those whom it [force]
touches,’ see her essay “L’Iliade ou le poème de la force” in Œuvres, ed. Florence de Lussy
(Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 1999), 527–51.
45
Weil’s love for the others and recognition of truth in other traditions were some of
the elements that held her from ofcially becoming a Catholic by accepting baptism, despite
her conversion to the Catholic faith. She afrmed to be a Catholic “of right,” but not “of
fact,” because of institutional positions of the Catholic Church regarding other religious
traditions. See her letter to Fr. Perrin called “Autobiographie Spirituelle,” in Attende de Dieu
(Paris: Le Colombe, 1950), 82. See also this commentary on the position of Weil in regards
to the institutional Church and baptism and the hypothetical argument that she perhaps
would change her decision if she were alive to see Vatican II and its development regarding
the acceptance of the presence of truth in other traditions and its openness to dialogue
with the modern world: Faustino Teixeira, “Simone Weil: Uma Paixão Sem Fronteiras,”
Convergência 42, no. 411 (2008): 313–327.
44
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